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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 14-1416 
____________ 
 
IN RE: NEZZY ADDERLY, 
    Petitioner 
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from 
the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to D.C. Crim. No. 2-06-cr-00548-001) 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. Pro. 21 
February 27, 2014 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 10, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Petitioner Nezzy Adderly was convicted in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania of the crime of being a convicted felon in possession of 
a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and the crime of being an armed career 
criminal, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (the “ACCA”).  He was sentenced to the 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years.  We affirmed in United States v. 
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Adderly, 306 F. App’x 766 (3d Cir. 2009).  On July 21, 2009, Adderly filed a motion to 
vacate sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the District Court denied.  See United States v. 
Adderly, 2010 WL 1047689 (E.D. Pa. March 19, 2010).  The District Court set forth a 
chart of Adderly’s criminal convictions, and concluded that he had more than the 
requisite number of predicate violent felonies.  Adderly, 2010 WL 1047689, at *3.  
Adderly appealed, and we denied his request for a certificate of appealability, see C.A. 
No. 10-1902. 
 On June 20, 2012, Adderly filed a motion under Rule 60(b) in his section 2255 
proceedings, arguing that the judgment should be reopened because he is not an armed 
career criminal under these Supreme Court decisions: Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 
133 (2010); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009); and Begay v. United States, 
553 U.S. 137 (2008).  In an order entered on August 2, 2012, the District Court denied 
the Rule 60(b) motion.  Adderly appealed, and we denied his request for a certificate of 
appealability on the ground that the Rule 60(b) motion was in reality an unauthorized 
second or successive section 2255 motion, see C.A. No. 12-3280.  On December 12, 
2012, Adderly filed another Rule 60(b) motion, in which he again argued that he did not 
have the required number of violent felonies to be classified as an armed career criminal.  
The District Court denied the motion as untimely and duplicative of the earlier Rule 60(b) 
motion.  Adderly appealed, and we denied his request for a certificate of appealability, 
concluding that reasonable jurists would not find it debatable, Slack v. McDaniel, 529 
U.S. 473, 484 (2000), that Adderly’s latest Rule 60(b) motion was in reality an 
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unauthorized second or successive motion to vacate sentence, and that the District Court 
lacked jurisdiction to consider it.  See C.A. No. 12-4571.   
Meanwhile, on January 4, 2013, Adderly filed an item in the district court titled 
“Petition in Support of Raising a Federal Question Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”  
In this petition, Adderly argued that the District Court, in making its prior ACCA violent 
felonies determination, had failed to apply the categorical or modified categorical 
approach as required by Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), and Shepard v. 
United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005).  Had the court done so, Adderly argued, it would have 
discovered that his three state robbery convictions pursuant to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
3701 were not violent felonies under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).  When the 
District Court did not timely rule on this “Petition,” Adderly filed a petition for writ of 
mandamus in this Court.  We denied mandamus relief, concluding that the January, 2013 
“Petition” presented the same issue Adderly had tried unsuccessfully to pursue in his 
prior Rule 60(b) motions, and like his Rule 60(b) motions, it sought to advance one or 
more substantive claims attacking his armed career criminal sentence.  It thus qualified as 
second or successive section 2255 motion which could not proceed in the district court 
without prior authorization from a court of appeals.  See In re: Adderly, 522 F. App’x 
151, 153 (3d Cir. 2013).   
In June, 2013, Adderly sought leave in this Court to file a second or successive 
section 2255 motion, contending that he had newly discovered evidence -- the record of 
his three 1985 robbery convictions and 1988 conspiracy to commit robbery conviction – 
4 
 
to prove that he is not an armed career criminal under the “modified categorical 
approach” of Shepard, 544 U.S. 13.  We denied him leave to file a second or successive 
section 2255 motion, concluding that he could not meet the gatekeeping requirements of 
section 2255(h), and that the federal question jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, did 
not supply an independent basis for jurisdiction over his collateral attack on his armed 
career criminal sentence, see C.A. No. 13-2474.  
In September, 2013, Adderly filed another Rule 60(b) motion, seeking to reopen 
his section 2255 proceedings.  The District Court denied the motion, and we again denied 
Adderly a certificate of appealability on the ground that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction to consider it, see Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530-32 (2005).  In our 
order denying a certificate of appealability, we advised Adderly that the continued filing 
of frivolous pleadings could lead to financial sanctions and restrictions, see C.A. No. 13-
3990. 
At issue now, Adderly again seeks mandamus relief because the District Court still 
has not ruled on his January 4, 2013 “Petition in Support of Raising a Federal Question 
Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”   
  We will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.  Our jurisdiction derives from 28 
U.S.C. § 1651, which grants us the power to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in 
aid of (our) . . . jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”  A writ of 
mandamus is an extreme remedy that is invoked only in extraordinary situations.  See 
Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).  To justify the use of this 
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extraordinary remedy, a petitioner must show both a clear and indisputable right to the 
writ and that he has no other adequate means to obtain the relief desired.  See Haines v. 
Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992).  The “Petition in Support of Raising a 
Federal Question” seeks to advance one or more substantive claims attacking Adderly’s 
armed career criminal sentence.  As we previously explained, it thus qualifies as second 
or successive section 2255 motion which cannot proceed in the district court without 
prior authorization from a court of appeals (which we have previously denied).  Although 
a writ of mandamus may be warranted where undue delay is tantamount to a failure to 
exercise jurisdiction, Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996), and a 14-month 
delay usually presents a due process issue, see Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1285 
(10th Cir. 1990) (court’s congested docket did not justify 14-month delay in adjudicating 
habeas corpus petition); Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1978) (district 
court’s 14-month delay in adjudicating petition following remand from appeals court 
denied petitioner due process), where jurisdiction is lacking in the first instance, as it is 
here, it cannot be said that a litigant’s right to an expeditious ruling is “clear and 
indisputable.”1 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus. 
                                              
1
 Adderly is free to write to the District Court and request a ruling on his January, 2013 
petition. 
